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BLD-152

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1177
___________
JAMES GEORGE DOURIS,
Appellant
v.

UPPER MAKEFIELD TOWNSHIP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-01469)
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
Before:

March 29, 2012
SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : April 12, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM 1
James
Court, 2

Douris,

sued

a

Upper

frequent

litigant

before

Makefield

Township

for

alleged

violations of the Constitution and federal law.
proceeded
status.

pro

se

and

was

granted

in

forma

this

He

pauperis

During motions practice, and in support of a

1

In light of the Clerk’s order of January 27, 2012,
this opinion is presented in Courier New 14-point
monospace font.

2

See Douris v. Middletown Twp., 353 F. App’x 672 (3d
Cir. 2009) (appeal dismissed as frivolous); Douris v.
Newtown Borough, No. 07-4427, 2009 WL 90848 (3d Cir.
Jan. 15, 2009) (affirming denial of in forma pauperis
status); Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130
(3d Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of in forma pauperis
status, while remanding for reconsideration of an order
entered without jurisdiction); Douris v. Huff, 260 F.
App’x 441 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming District Court’s
dismissal
of
complaint
under
28
U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B)); Douris v. Newtown Borough, Inc., 207 F.
App’x 242 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Douris v. Office of
the Pa. Att’y Gen., 174 F. App’x 691 (3d Cir. 2006)
(affirming dismissal of complaint); Douris v. Bucks
Cnty., 145 F. App’x 735 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Douris
v. Genuardi’s Family Mkts., Inc., 132 F. App’x 425 (3d
Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment);
Douris v. Rendell, 100 F. App’x 126 (3d Cir. 2004)
(table); Douris v. Dougherty, 90 F. App’x 434 (3d Cir.
2004) (table); Douris v. Cnty. of Bucks, 85 F. App’x
870 (3d Cir. 2003) (table).
2

motion

for

default

judgment,

Douris

submitted

a

document to the District Court that appeared to have
been modified to show an earlier service date.

Compare

Pl. Adds to Pl.’s Claim of J. by Default Ex. 1, ECF No.
13, with Process Receipt, ECF No. 5.

Upper Makefield

Township asked the District Court to sanction Douris by
dismissing his complaint, a motion that Douris did not
meaningfully oppose.
had

“made

a

submissions,

The Court concluded that Douris

material
and

found

misrepresentation”
this

in

“outrageous”

his

action—

otherwise unexplained by Douris—to merit dismissal with
prejudice.

See Order, ECF No. 17.

In response, Douris

filed a motion accusing the District Court of being “in
violation

of

the

law”

for

not

accommodating

disabilities (the “July 25 motion”).

his

The motion was

denied, and this appeal followed.
We

have

jurisdiction

under

3

28

U.S.C.

§

1291, 3

The District Court dismissed Douris’s complaint by an
order entered on the civil docket on July 21, 2011.
The order, which contained reasoning explaining the
decision to dismiss (albeit through the use of
3

reviewing the District Court’s decision to dismiss the
complaint as a sanction for abuse of discretion while
evaluating its factual findings for clear error. 4
Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1988);

In re
Poulis

v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868
footnotes), did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 58, also known as the “separate document” or
“separate judgment” rule.
To be in compliance with
Rule 58, an order must substantially “omit[] the
District Court’s reasons for disposing of the parties’
motions as it did.”
Local Union No. 1992 of IBEW v.
Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 2004); see also
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d
217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).
Because the order contained
substantial reasoning, and was therefore not in
compliance with Rule 58, the time of its entry was set
at 150 days after its appearance on the civil docket,
which we calculate to be Sunday, December 18, 2011.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(7)(A)(ii); UAW Local 259 Soc. Sec. Dep’t v. Metro
Auto Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2007). Since the
last day of the period was a Sunday, the order was
entered the next day: Monday, December 19, 2011.
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
6(a)(1)(C);
Fed.
R.
App.
P.
26(a)(1)(C).
Douris was then required to file his
notice of appeal within thirty days, see Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(A); the District Court docket reflects an
on-time filing on January 18, 2012.
4

We detect no such error in the District Court’s
central factual finding: that Douris modified the
process receipt in support of his motion for default
judgment.
4

(3d

Cir.

sanction

1984).
of

Recognizing

last

resort,

we

that
focus

dismissal
on

is

whether

a

the

District Court properly balanced the Poulis factors 5 in
deciding to dismiss the complaint.

Hicks v. Feeney,

850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988).

“In balancing the

Poulis factors, we do not have a ‘magic formula’ or
‘mechanical

calculation’

to

determine

whether

a

District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a
plaintiff’s case.”
(3d

Cir.

2008)

Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263

(citing

Mindek

v.

Rigatti,

964

F.2d

1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).
While not invoking Poulis by name, the District
Court appears to have appropriately weighed relevant
5

These factors are: “(1) the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary . . . ; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4)
whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of
sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis
of
alternative
sanctions;
and
(6)
the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.” Poulis, 747
F.2d at 868 (emphasis in original). “Not all of these
factors need be met for a district court to find
dismissal is warranted.” Hicks, 850 F.3d at 156.
5

factors,

addressing

of

Douris’s

conduct and his apparent lack of contrition.

As a pro

se

for

litigant,

Douris

the

egregiousness

alone

content of his submissions.

was

responsible

the

Further, Douris’s history

of “frivolous” and “abusive” filings was well known to
the Court.

See Order n.1 (citing Douris v. Middletown

Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 132–33 (3d Cir. 2008)).
was

given

an

opportunity

to

correct

the

Douris

record

or

withdraw his motion, 6 but did not do so, and failed to
address the discrepancy observed by the defendant and
the District Court—a plausible sign of both willfulness
and bad faith.
The District Court did not specifically discuss the
6

According to the defendant, Douris was notified by
mail
on
April
11,
2011,
of
his
material
misrepresentation and the possible consequences, and
was given time to withdraw the material or explain his
conduct. See Mot. for Sanctions ¶ 5,ECF No. 16. The
defendant had originally pointed out the sanctionable
conduct to the Court in its response of April 8. See
Resp. ¶¶ 1, 3, ECF No. 14.
More than two months
elapsed between the motion for sanctions and the
District Court’s decision, with no response from
Douris.
6

final two relevant Poulis factors: the effectiveness of
alternative sanctions and the meritoriousness of the
claim.

Despite this, we do not find reversible error

under the deferential standard of review that controls.
See Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429–30 (holding
that conduct by a litigant can be so “contumacious”
that a district court need not specifically write about
each of the Poulis considerations).

With regard to

alternative sanctions, such as financial penalties, the
District Court’s options were limited by Douris’s pro
se and in forma pauperis status.
at

262–63.

As

to

the

See Briscoe, 538 F.3d

meritoriousness

of

Douris’s

complaint, we note his history of frivolous suits. 7
All in all,

we must conclude that the

District

Court acted within its discretion when it dismissed
Douris’s complaint based on his willingness to falsify
7

We have noted that both the decision to impose
sanctions and their extent can be guided by “equitable
considerations,” which may include a history of filing
frivolous actions.
See Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 197 n.6 (3d Cir.
1988).
7

documents

at

an

early

stage

of

litigation

refusal to withdraw the misrepresentation.

and

his

“[I]t is

arguable that a litigant who defrauds the court should
not be permitted to continue to press his case [in
certain circumstances].”

Allen v. Chi. Transit Auth.,

317 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.). 8
further

conclude

that

the

District

Court

We

correctly

denied Douris’s July 25 motion, which had requested no
easily

discernible

relief;

and

while

Douris

demonstrated that various District Court documents were
sent to the wrong address, he does not appear to have
been prejudiced by this error.
In

sum,

finding

no

substantial

question

to

be

presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm.
United States v. Rhines, 640 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2011)
(per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6.

8

See also Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 569
F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he affirmative
submission of false evidence is, at minimum, akin to a
fraud on the court, which other courts have found may
justify the sanction of dismissal.” (citing Allen)).
8

